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Abstract 
  
Development of mobile web-centric OS such as Firefox OS has created new challenges, and 
opportunities for digital investigators. Network traffic forensic plays an important role in 
cybercrime investigation to detect subject(s) and object(s) of the crime.  In this chapter, we 
detect and analyze residual network traffic artefacts of Firefox OS in relation to two popular 
social networking applications (Facebook and Twitter) and one instant messaging application 
(Telegram).  We utilized a Firefox OS simulator to generate relevant traffic while all 
communication data were captured using network monitoring tools. Captured network packets 
were examined and remnants with forensic value were reported. This paper as the first focused 
study on mobile Firefox OS network traffic analysis should pave the way for the future research 
in this direction. 
 
Keywords: Firefox OS; digital forensics; mobile forensics; network monitoring; network traffic; 
virtual environment
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The significant rise of social media networking, instant messaging platform, webmail and 
other mobile web applications has spawned the idea to build mobile web-centric operating 
systems (OS) using different open web standards like HTML5, CSS3, and JavaScript. Due to 
that fact, Mozilla has released the world’s first mobile web-centric OS on February 21st, 2013. 
This mobile web-centric OS is based on Firefox web browser rendering engine on top of Linux 
kernel, called Firefox OS (FxOS) (Mozilla Corporation, 2013). The emergence of mobile web-
centric OS has created new challenges, concentrations and opportunities for digital investigators. 
In general, the growth of mobile devices may allow cybercriminals to utilize social media and 
instant messaging services for malicious purposes (Mohtasebi and Dehghantanha, 2011) such as 
spreading malicious codes, obtaining and disseminating confidential information etc. 
Furthermore, copyright infringement, cyber stalking, cyber bullying, slander spreading and 
sexual harassment are becoming serious threats to mobile device users (Dezfouli et al., 2013). 
Therefore, it is common to confront with different types of mobile devices during variety of 
forensics investigation cases (Damshenas et al., 2014).  
Many previous studies were focused on detection and analysis of network traffic artefacts 
for cyber forensics. Quick and Choo run Dropbox cloud storage in virtual environment machine 
and all network activities were recorded (Quick and Choo, 2013a). Network Miner 1.0 
(Hjelmvik, 2014) and Wireshark Portable 1.6.5 (Combs, 2013) were used to capture the network 
traffic in many circumstances and network traffic was seen on TCP port 80 and 443 only. Quick 
and Choo also run Microsoft SkyDrive in virtual environment machine using the same method 
(Quick and Choo, 2013b). The result were tabled with more information such as IP start, IP 
finish, URL observed in network traffic and registered owner. No username and password were 
observed in the clear text network traffic. Quick and Choo continued the research and run 
Google Drive cloud storage as the case study (Quick and Choo, 2014). Google Drive account 
credential was observed but cannot be seen in the network traffic, suggesting the data was 
encrypted. Martini and Choo observed network traffic from virtual environment network adapter 
using ownCloud as a case study (Martini and Choo, 2013). HTTP Basic authentications were 
captured and user’s ownCloud credentials were successfully displayed. Farina produced an 
analysis of the sequence of network traffic and file I/O interactions in the torrent synchronization 
process (Farina et al., 2014). Bittorrent client were used as the test subject.  
Utilizing virtual machines for generating network traffic is a very common in forensics 
research. Blakeley investigate cloud storage software using hubiC as a case study (Blakeley et 
al., 2015). In the network analysis part, it was observed that a redirect to HTTPS on port 8080 
was returned when the initial request was made to www.hubic.com. This shows that there was no 
plaintext traffic accepted by the hubiC website. Shariati run network analysis using SugarSync 
cloud storage (Shariati et al., 2015). Majority of communication were encrypted and no 
credentials or contents of sample data-set were able to be recovered. Dezfouli investigated 
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Google+ artefacts on Android and iOS. During experiment, 
network activities were captured and able to determine user’s IP address, domain name of 
connected social media sites and corresponding session timestamps. Yang identify network 
artefacts of Facebook and Skype Windows Store application (Yang et al., 2016). Yang was able 
 to correlate the IP addresses with the timestamp information to determine when the application 
was started up and the duration of application used during experiment. Daryabar investigated 
OneDrive, Box, Google Drive, Dropbox applications on Android and iOS devices (Daryabar et 
al., 2016a). In network analysis part, the connection were secured between cloud client 
application and the server, thus no credential were able to be seen. Daryabar also investigated the 
MEGA cloud client application on Android and iOS (Daryabar et al., 2016b). Daryabar identify 
network artefact arising from user activities, such as login, uploading, downloading, deletion, 
and file sharing including timestamps. Table 1 is reflecting literature summary of network 
analysis and monitoring captured through virtual environment network adapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 - Summary of Network Analysis and Monitoring Captured through Virtual Environment 
Network Adapter 
 
Researcher(s) Application(s) Application Type 
Martini and Choo 2013 OwnCloud Cloud Storage 
Quick and Choo 2013b Dropbox Cloud Storage 
Quick and Choo 2013c Microsoft SkyDrive Cloud Storage 
Quick and Choo 2014 Google Drive Cloud Storage 
Farina et al. 2014 Bittorrent Torrent Client 
Blakeley et al. 2015 hubiC Cloud Storage 
Shariati et al. 2015 SugarSync Cloud Storage 
Dezfouli et al. 2015 Facebook, Twitter,  
LinkdIn, Google + 
Social Media 
Yang et al. 2016 Facebook,  
Skype 
Social Media 
VoIP 
Daryabar et al. 2016 OneDrive, Box, Google 
Drive, Dropbox 
Cloud Storage 
Daryabar et al. 2016 MEGA Cloud Storage 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, there was no previous analyzing FxOS network traffic 
artefacts. FxOS is designed to allow mobile devices to communicate directly with HTML5 
applications using JavaScript and newly introduced WebAPI. However, the used of JavaScript in 
HTML5 applications and solely no OS restriction might lead to security issues and further 
potential exploits and threats. FxOS is still not fully supported by most of the existing mobile 
forensic tools which further urgencies for further research development in this area (Yusoff et al., 
2014a).  
In this chapter, we were focused on analysis of residual network traffic artefacts in FxOS. 
Two popular social networking applications (Facebook and Twitter) and one instant messaging 
application (Telegram) were investigated as case studies. In the earliest days, investigators used 
to put the mobile phone in the special sandbox to monitor mobile GSM activities (Androulidakis, 
2012). This method however, requires a lot of expensive devices and thus, the phone monitoring 
process became more complicated and very costly. FxOS simulator is a virtualised version of the 
 FxOS that runs provides full user experience and FxOS features. Therefore, we have followed 
the method proposed by Quick and Choo and simulated FxOS in a virtual environment machine 
(Quick and Choo, 2013c). When we performed the communication activities using the FxOS 
simulator, we used the Network Analyzer to capture and monitor the network traffic. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we have explained the 
methodology used and outlined the setup for our experiment. In section 3, we have presented our 
research findings and finally concluded our research in section 4. 
 
2. Experiment Setup 
 
Network analysis is a procedure for investigating the movement of data that travel across 
the targeted network. This procedure was performed by analyzing and carving the captured 
network artefacts. In general, the collection of network artefact for mobile devices is very 
difficult because of the limitation of mobile hardware and mobile OS itself. It is in contrary with 
conventional desktop OS, which we can easily captured the network files using various tools 
available. For that reason alone, we have adapted an approach for forensic collection of cloud 
artefacts (Quick and Choo, 2013b, 2013c, 2014) into our research methodology. Quick and Choo 
analysed several cloud applications using virtual machines and captured and analysed network 
traffic activities. In this chapter, we run FxOS simulator within VMware (VM) (VMware, 2013), 
configuerd with two popular social networking applications (Facebook and Twitter) and one 
instant messaging application (Telegram); which we will perform communication tasks in 
different scenarios. All the network activities are then captured and analysed using network 
analysis tools.  
FxOS Simulator is an add-on simulator for the Firefox browser that enables users to run 
FxOS on any desktop computer. It comes with the Dashboard, a tool hosted by Firefox web-
browser that enables users to start and stop the simulator; install and uninstall the applications; 
and to debug FxOS applications . The Dashboard is also use to push applications to a real device, 
and checks application manifests for any common problems. Three applications which are two 
popular social networking applications (Facebook and Twitter) and one instant messaging 
application (Telegram) installed in the VM disk and communications activities were performed 
to detect and investigate residential artefacts. Separated VM disks were then created for every 
taken action and all the network activities were captured and monitored. Figure illustrates our 
experiments setup. 
  
  
 
Figure 1: FxOS Network Traffic Analysis Methodology. 
 
As the network analyzer captures all VM network activities including Windows 8.1 
services  we have filtered out non relevant network data using Wireshark 1.12.5. We have 
repeated our investigation using Ubuntu 14.04 LTS and the network packets in both environment 
were complementarities. This research experiment setup was divided into four stages; (1) 
Preparing  virtual machines with selected applications; (2) Executing the activities and 
documenting all steps taken (3) Capturing the network activities; and (4) Conducting network 
analysis. 
 
 
 
2.1 Preparing Virtual Machines  
 
In this experiment, we run FxOS simulator on Windows 8.1 and Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 
uutilising VMware Player 10.0.1. Our experiments were mainly focused on applications that 
regularly stimulate user communications and applications usage. We have configured two 
popular social networking applications (Facebook and Twitter) and one instant messaging 
application (Telegram) as our test subjects. Several tasks were performed in different sets of 
scenarios and all the network activities were captured using Wireshark 1.12.5 and Microsoft 
Network Monitor 3.4. (Microsoft, 2010). For analysis part, we have used the Network Miner 
1.6.1 to carve related network artefacts. Table 2 shows all the software and applications that were 
used in our experiment 
 
Table 2 - Software and Applications for FxOS Network Traffic Investigation 
 
Software or Application Purpose 
Windows 8.1 Operating System 
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS Operating System 
VMware Player 10.0.1 Provides virtual environment 
Wireshark 1.12.5 Capturing and monitoring network activities 
Microsoft Network Monitor 3.4 Monitoring network activities 
Network Miner 1.6.1 Carving and identifying evidences from network packets  
 Facebook Test application (Social Media) 
Twitter Test application (Social Media) 
Telegram Test application (Instant Messaging) 
 
As shown in Figure 2, a total of 11 VMs 11 physical systems were created for Windows 
and Ubuntu respectively. Each VM disk represents a scenario in our experiment. All VM disks 
were configured with Windows or Ubuntu installed on 20GB virtual hard drive and equipped 
with 1GB RAM.  
In general, the VMs were grouped into 4 groups which are Base, Facebook, Twitter and 
Telegram groups. The Base VM01 consists of standard OS setup. From this point, the disk was 
copied, Firefox browser as well as FxOS simulator were installed in VM02. The following VMs 
Three copies of VM02 were configured with applications of interest (Facebook (VM03), Twitter 
(VM06) and Telegram (VM09)) and named accordingly. The remaining VMs were created in 
accordance with scenario experiments out of the first VM disks of each group. 
 
Base VM
VM01
Basic Setup
VM02
FxOS Installed
Twitter
VM06
Install
VM07
Login
VM08
Activities
Facebook
VM03
Install
VM04
Login
VM05
Activities
Telegram
VM09
Install
VM10
Login
VM11
Activities
 
 
Figure 2: Virtual Machine Hierarchy for Network Analysis Investigation 
 
 
2.2 Executing Activities  
 
Conducting all activities and documenting all steps were taken for future reference and to 
support soundness of investigation. Every scenario was performed with predefined 
communication activities as shown in Table 3. 
For login activates, we have created a dummy account with email and password 
of“mohd.najwadi@gmail.com” and “najwadi87” respectively. For instant messaging account, we 
 have registered the account using mobile number “+60162444415” communication with another 
mobile number “+60125999159”. 
2.3 Capturing Network Activities 
 
The objective of this analysis was to identify the correct traffic path, for several famous 
communication activities in mobile phone. From the packets, we need to identify what data can 
be seen in network traffic, what protocol were being used, who issued the certificates, and will 
there be any credential captured. In this experiment, we run FxOS simulator in the VMware 
player. All network traffics from FxOS simulator were captured once with Wireshark 1.12.5 and 
another time using Microsoft Network Monitor 3.4 as a backup capturing tool. In order to 
capture the network traffic from VMware player, VMware network adapter was set to NAT. 
Figure 3 shows the network packets captured by Wireshark when we executed the 
communication activities using the FxOS simulator. 
 
 
Table 3 - Configuration of Virtual Machine with the Communication Activities 
 
VM Disk Scenario Details 
Base   
  VM01 Base  Base configuration was installed with Windows 8.1 or Ubuntu 14.04 on 
20GB virtual hard drive and 1GB Ram. 
  VM02 Install Simulator VM01 was copied. Firefox Browser and FxOS simulator was installed  
Facebook   
  VM03 Installation VM02 was copied and Facebook application was installed 
  VM04 Login process VM03 was copied and used to login with prepared social media account 
  VM05 Activities VM04 was copied and performed posting, comment, like comment, reply 
comment, send message,  add friend, and follow 
Twitter   
  VM06 Installation VM02 was copied and Twitter application was installed 
  VM07 Login process VM06 was copied and used to login with prepared social media account  
  VM08 Activities VM07 was copied and performed tweet, reply tweet, favorite tweet, 
retweet, use hashtag, follow, and unfollow 
Telegram   
  VM09 Installation VM02 was copied and Telegram application was installed 
  VM10 Registration VM09 was copied and used to register telegram account 
  VM11 Activities VM10 was copied and performed create contacts, send text, reply text, 
received picture, and share location 
 
  
 
Figure 3 - Network Packets Captured by Wireshark 
 
Apart from capturing the network activities, we have also saved the virtual memory by 
copying all virtual memory (.vmem) files generated by VMwares. The virtual memory files were 
copied after performing all the activities prior to shutting down VMs. At the end of experiments 
we had three files of network packets (.pcap), virtual hard drive (.vmdk) and virtual memory 
(.vmem) for analysis. However, this paper only reports our analysis of .pcap network traffic files 
and interested readers may refer to authors previous publications reporting analysis of other files 
(Yusoff et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d). 
 
2.4 Conducting Network Analysis  
 
Network traffic analysis is the process of capturing, reviewing and analyzing network 
traffic for the purpose of security, performance and management. The process of analyzing the 
network traffic can be performed manually or using automated techniques. In this paper, network 
packets were analyzed manually using Network Miner 1.6.1 to find the source and destination IP 
address, communication port, owner of the IP, domain and subdomain, credential, images, 
certificate used, certificate validity, etc. Detected IP was then checked in IP address lookup 
website at http://www.ipchecking.com/, in the attempt to find the owner, hostname, country 
origin and reverse DNS.  
We have also monitored and analyzed the packets using Wireshark 1.12.5 and Microsoft 
Network Monitor 3.4 to detect the timestamp, flow of handshakes for SSL encrypted traffics and  
to extract the certificate (in $\NetworkMiner_1-6-1\AssembledFiles folder according the source 
IP subfolder). Figure 4 shows an example of a certificate retrieved from communication with 
Facebook.  
  
  
 
Figure 4: Captured SSL Certificate Detail Information 
 
 
 
 
3. Discussion and Analysis 
 
First, our network analysis started by observing the network traffic during installation of 
FxOS simulator. This simulator was installed as an add-on in Firefox browser. To install the 
simulator, we have navigated to the Firefox add-on download page, and search for FxOS 
simulator. The moment we click the “+ Add to Firefox” button, the initial connection was 
established on “download.dynect.mozilla.net” with the observed IP of 63.245.217.39 over the 
port 80. This IP was registered to Mozilla and we were also managed to capture all account 
credential with the username of “_ga=GA1.2.389580134.1432816473” without any password 
required for login process.  
During the downloading process, we can see a high traffic movement from 
“*.cdn.mozilla.net” with the observed IP of 68.232.34.191 over the port 443. The connections 
were encrypted and the certificate was issued by DigiCert High Assurance CA-3. In addition, we 
have also detected network traffic from “aus4.mozilla.com” with the observed IP of 
63.245.217.43, 63.245.217.138 and 63.245.217.219 over the port 80 but no data worth for 
forensic evidence was captured. Our next step is to observe and analyze the network movement, 
for each of our selected applications. 
 
3.1 Network Analysis of Facebook 
  
Facebook is one of the most used social network application in any mobile platforms. 
Forensic investigation of Facebook was contained very huge amount of forensic worth of 
evidences. Network analysis for Facebook applications consist of three stages starting from the 
application installation, credential login and communication activities performed using Facebook 
application in FxOS. VM disks were created for installation, credential login and communication 
activities stages for ease of organizing and monitoring purposes. When accessing FxOS 
marketplace, the initial session was established on “marketplace.firefox.com” with the observed 
IP of 63.245.216.131 over the port 80. The network movements were also detected on port 443 
simultaneously and its certificate were issued by DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA 
and DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA. In addition for this case, we have also detected 
network traffics from Google Internet Authority with the observed IP of 216.58.210.46. These 
services were encrypted whereas their certificates were issued by Google Internet Authority G2, 
GeoTrust Global CA and Equifax Secure Certificate Authority 
When browsing the application list in the marketplace, we again saw the network traffic 
from “*.cdn.mozilla.net” with the observed IP of 68.232.34.191 over the port 443, the same IP 
server when we downloaded the simulator. Once we have found Facebook application in the list, 
we clicked its icon and we then received the packet from “m.facebook.com” with the observed 
IP of 31.13.90.2 over the port 443. Twelve packets were received when we clicked the icon and 
the certificates were from DigiCert High Assurance CA-3 and DigiCert High Assurance EV 
Root CA. Next, we have captured the network traffic coming from “addons.dynect.mozilla.net” 
and “services.addons.mozilla.org” with the observed IP of 63.245.216.132 and 63.245.216.134 
over the port 443 respectively. Both certificates were issued by DigiCert High Assurance EV 
CA-1. Marketplace was prompted for installation once we clicked the icon. The moment we 
accepted application installation, we have received the packet from “*.akamai.net” and 
“*.edgesuite.net” with the observed IP of 176.255.203.* over the port 80 and 443 
simultaneously. This IP belongs to Facebook and the certificates were issued by Baltimore 
CyberTrust Root, GTE CyberTrust Global Root and Cybertrust Public SureServer SV CA. We 
have also detected a network traffics from “marketplace.firefox.com” and “*.cdn.mozilla.net” 
over the port 443 during Facebook application installation. As usual, the Facebook icon was 
created at the home screen as soon as the installation has finished.  
Next, when we opened the Facebook application, we received the packets again from 
“m.facebook.com”. The Facebook application has directed us to the login page and we have used 
the prepared Facebook account to login. The login process for Facebook application has caught 
our attention. Immediately after we clicked the login button, the traffic were encrypted and the 
packet captured were from "safebrowsing.cache.l.google.com" with the observed IP of 
90.222.188.* over the port 443. The certificates were issued by Google Internet Authority G2, 
GeoTrust Global CA and Equifax Secure Certificate Authority. These services were used to 
check malicious activities which downloaded and installed malicious software without the user 
consent. We then repeated the login process multiple times and based on our observation, the 
checking were running randomly as we only manage to capture this packet twice.  
After successfully authenticating to our test account, we scrolled down to the Facebook 
newsfeed and we have identified the captured packet again came from “*.akamai.net”, “fbcdn-
profile-a.akamaihd.net”, and “fbcdn-photos-c-a.akamaihd.net.edgesuite.net” with the observed 
IP of 176.255.203.* over the port 80 and 443. Various issuer of certificates such as from 
Cybertrust Public SureServer SV CA, GTE Cybertrust Global Root, and Baltimore Cybertrust 
 Root has been identified. The packets from this server were carrying Facebook image, text, as 
well as other encrypted communication. We have performed several Facebook activities such as 
post a status, post a picture, comment and like friend’s status, send Facebook private message, 
received private message, user search and post an emoticon. All of these activities came from 
“*.akamai.net”, “fbcdn-profile-a.akamaihd.net”, and “fbcdn-photos-c-
a.akamaihd.net.edgesuite.net”. On the other hand, network traffics from Google services such as 
Google Analytic and Google Internet Authority were captured; starting from the moment we 
open the marketplace until the end of our experiment. The same network traffic were also 
observed on Ubuntu experiment. Table 4 shows the summary of our observed IPs together with 
their registered organization, country origin and certificate issuers for Facebook experiment 
 
Table 4: Observed IP and Registered Organisation for Facebook Experiment 
Registered 
Organization 
Observed IP Country Origin Certificate Issuers 
Mozilla 63.245.216.131  
63.245.216.132 
63.245.216.134 
United States 
United States 
United States 
- DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA  
- DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA 
68.232.34.191 United States - DigiCert High Assurance CA-3 
Google 216.58.210.46 
 
United States 
 
- Google Internet Authority G2 
- GeoTrust Global CA 
- Equifax Secure Certificate Authority 
90.222.188.0 - 
90.222.188.255 
United Kingdom - Google Internet Authority G2 
- GeoTrust Global CA 
- Equifax Secure Certificate Authority 
Facebook 31.13.90.2 
 
Ireland 
 
- DigiCert High Assurance CA-3 
- DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA 
90.223.223.0 - 
90.223.223.255 
176.255.203.0 - 
176.255.203.255 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
- Cybertrust Public SureServer SV CA 
- GTE Cybertrust Global Root 
- Baltimore Cybertrust Root 
 
3.2 Network Analysis on Twitter 
Network analysis of Twitter application followed the same steps of Facebook application 
consisted of three stages starting from the application installation, credential login and 
communication activities using Twitter application in FxOS. VM disks were created for 
installation, credential login and communication activities stages for ease of organizing and 
monitoring purposes. We again need to access FxOS marketplace in order to install the Twitter 
application. The packets were captured again from “marketplace.firefox.com” with the observed 
IP of 63.245.216.131 over the port 80 and 443 simultaneously. For encrypted packets, the 
certificates were issued by DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA and DigiCert High 
Assurance EV Root CA. Similarly, we have also detected network traffics from Google Internet 
Authority with the observed IP of 216.58.210.78 for this case. These services were encrypted 
whereas their certificates were issued by Google Internet Authority G2, GeoTrust Global CA and 
Equifax Secure Certificate Authority. 
Likewise, we again saw the network traffic from “*.cdn.mozilla.net” with the observed IP 
of 68.232.34.191 over the port 443, when we browsed the application list in Mozilla Marketplace 
and the certificate was issued by DigiCert High Assurance CA-3. However, we have captured a 
different source of packets when we clicked on Twitter icon. The packets we received were from 
“mobile.twitter.com” with the observed IP of 185.45.5.37 and 185.45.5.48 over the port 443. 
 Both IP’s certificates were issued by Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA-G4 and Symantec 
Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority-G5. We have also managed to capture the 
network traffic from “addons.dynect.mozilla.net” and “services.addons.mozilla.org” with the 
observed IP of 63.245.216.132 and 63.245.216.134 over the port 443 respectively, which were 
the same packets at the same stage during our previous experiment. At the point we accepted for 
application installation, we received the packets from “ocsp.ws.symantec.com.edgekey.net” and 
“ss.symcd.com” with the observed IP of 23.54.139.27 over the port 80. This server was 
transmitting the application data from the server hosted by Akamai Technologies, a cloud service 
provider based in the United States. As usual, network traffics came from Google services as 
well as from “marketplace.firefox.com” and “*.cdn.mozilla.net” over the port 443, were also 
detected during Twitter application installation. The Twitter icon was created at the home screen 
as soon as the installation was finished.  
Next, when opening the Twitter application, we received the packets again from 
“mobile.twitter.com”. Furthermore, we have also managed to capture the packets from 
“cs139.wac.edgecastcdn.net” and “*.twimg.com” with the observed IP of 68.232.35.172 over the 
port 443. The certificates were issued by DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA and DigiCert 
SHA2 High Assurance Server CA. From our investigation, these servers belong to Twitter. 
Similar to Facebook application, Twitter application has also directed us to the login page and 
we have used the pre-prepared Twitter account to login. For Twitter application, immediately 
after we clicked login button, the traffic were encrypted and we also managed to capture the 
packet from "safebrowsing.cache.l.google.com" with the observed IP of 90.222.188.* over the 
port 443. The certificates were issued by Google Internet Authority G2, GeoTrust Global CA and 
Equifax Secure Certificate Authority. This services were used to check downloaded and installed 
malicious software without user consent. In contrast to Facebook, we have managed to capture 
this packet every time we login to Twitter application. We continually received packet from 
“mobile.twitter.com” along, while the login process taking place.  
After successfully logged in to our test account, we then scrolled down to the Twitter 
newsfeed and managed to capture the packets from “*.twimg.com” with the observed IP of 
199.96.57.7 over the port 80 and 443 simultaneously. Previously, we have identified the packets 
from “*.twimg.com” but the source IP was different. The certificates were also issued by 
DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA and DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA. The 
packet from this server carried Twitter image, text, as well as other encrypted communication. 
Next, we have performed several Twitter activities such as tweet, reply tweet, retweet, follow 
and unfollow user, direct message, view profile, create hashtag and perform user search. All of 
these activities came from “mobile.twitter.com” and “*.twimg.com”. Similar to Facebook 
application, network traffics from Google services such as Google Analytic and Google Internet 
Authority were captured starting from the moment we open the marketplace until the end of our 
experiment. Table 5 shows the summary of our observed IP together with their registered 
organization, country origin and certificate issuers for Twitter experiment 
 
Table 5: Observed IP and Registered Organization for Twitter Experiment 
Registered 
Organization 
Observed IP Country Origin Certificate Issuers 
Mozilla 63.245.216.131  
63.245.216.132 
63.245.216.134 
United States 
 
- DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA  
- DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA 
68.232.34.191 United States - DigiCert High Assurance CA-3 
 Google 216.58.210.78 
 
United States 
 
- Google Internet Authority G2 
- GeoTrust Global CA 
- Equifax Secure Certificate Authority 
90.222.188.0 - 
90.222.188.255 
United Kingdom - Google Internet Authority G2 
- GeoTrust Global CA 
- Equifax Secure Certificate Authority 
Akamai 
Technologies 
23.54.139.27 United States N/A 
Twitter 68.232.35.172 
199.96.57.7 
United States - DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA 
- DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA 
185.45.5.37 
185.45.5.48 
United States - Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA-G4 
- Symantec Class 3 Public Primary Certification 
Authority-G5 
 
3.3 Network Analysis on Telegram 
Telegram was the only instant messaging application that we used in our experiment. 
following the same steps for Facebook and Twitter application, this experiment has also consists 
of three stages starting from the application installation, credential login and communication 
activities using Telegram application in FxOS. VM disks were created again for installation, 
credential login and communication activities stages, to ease the organizing and monitoring 
purposes. During installation of Telegram application, the packet were captured again from 
“marketplace.firefox.com” with the observed IP of 63.245.216.131 over the port 80 and 443 
simultaneously when we opened Mozilla Marketplace application from FxOS simulator. For 
encrypted packets, the certificates were issued by DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server 
CA and DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA. 
Next, when we browsed and searched the Telegram application in Mozilla Marketplace, 
we saw again the network traffic from “*.cdn.mozilla.net” with the observed IP of 68.232.34.191 
over the port 443 with the certificate was issued by DigiCert High Assurance CA-3. When we 
clicked the Telegram icon, we have received the installation data from 
“download.cdn.mozilla.net” with the observed IP of 93.184.221.133 over the post 80. We have 
also managed to capture the network traffic from “addons.dynect.mozilla.net” and 
“services.addons.mozilla.org” with the observed IP of 63.245.216.132 and 63.245.216.134 over 
the port 443 respectively, which were the same packets at the same stage during our previous 
experiment. The same as previous experiment, network traffics from “marketplace.firefox.com” 
and “*.cdn.mozilla.net” over the port 443 have also been detected during Telegram application 
installation. The Telegram icon was created at the home screen as soon as the installation 
finished.  
 Next, we then opened the Telegram application and to our surprise, we have received the 
packet from “marketplace.firefox.com” with the observed IP of 63.245.216.131. Normally, this 
packet is received when we clicked on Mozilla Marketplace icon. When the application was 
executed, we proceeded with Telegram phone number registration. The moment the phone 
number and country were selected, we received a packet from “addons-blocklist-
single1.vips.phx1.mozilla.com” with the observed IP of 63.245.217.113 over the port 80. Next, 
clicking the next button and while Telegram application was generating the registration key, we 
received the network traffic from “telegram.org” with the observed IP of 149.154.167.51 over 
the port 80. Registration code was received and our network capturing software recorded 
incoming network traffic again from “telegram.org” but with different observed IP which was 
149.154.167.91 over the port 80. At the same time, we have also received the network traffic 
 from “*.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com” with the observed IP of 52.24.145.20 over the port 
443. The certificates were issued by DigiCert Global Root CA and DigiCert SHA2 Secure Server 
CA. When we repeated our experiment with Ubuntu, the same traffic came through when we 
received registration key for Telegram. Therefore, we can conclude that this server was used to 
push and generate the registration key for Telegram. In contrary to Facebook and Twitter 
network analysis, we were no longer received the network traffic from 
"safebrowsing.cache.l.google.com" with the observed IP of 90.222.188.* during our experiment. 
This is because Telegram is only involved with messaging services and no browsing mechanisms 
were included.  
After registration process completed, we have performed several communication 
activities such as creating a new contact, opening chat windows, creating group and sending 
messages to other contact. During the activities, we have received the network traffic from 
“telegram.org” with the observed IP of 149.154.171.* over the port 80. When we received a 
message from other contact, incoming traffic were from “github.map.fastly.net” with the 
observed IP of 185.31.19.133 over the port 443. The certificates were issued by DigiCert High 
Assurance EV Root CA and DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA. We then continue our 
experiment by sharing our location to our contact and the network traffic was recorded from 
Google Internet Authority with the observed IP of 216.58.209.234 over the port 443. The 
services were encrypted whereas their certificates were issued by Google Internet Authority G2, 
GeoTrust Global CA and Equifax Secure Certificate Authority. Finally we ended our experiment 
by playing the song received from other contact and again, we received the network traffic from 
“*.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com” with the observed IP of 52.24.145.203 over the port 
443. Table 6 shows the summary of our observed IP together with their registered organization, 
country of origin and certificate issuers for Telegram experiment. 
 
 
Table 6: Observed IP and Registered Organisation for Twitter Experiment 
Registered 
Organization 
Observed IP Country Origin Certificate Issuers 
Mozilla 63.245.217.113   United States N/A 
63.245.216.131  
63.245.216.132 
63.245.216.134 
United States 
 
- DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA  
- DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA 
68.232.34.191 United States - DigiCert High Assurance CA-3 
93.184.221.133 United States N/A 
Google 
 
216.58.209.234 
 
United States 
 
- Google Internet Authority G2 
- GeoTrust Global CA 
- Equifax Secure Certificate Authority 
Telegram 149.154.167.51 
149.154.167.91 
United States N/A 
149.154.171.0 - 
149.154.171.255 
United States N/A 
Github 185.31.19.133 Unknown  - DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA 
- DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA 
Amazon 52.24.145.20 
52.24.145.203 
United States - DigiCert Global Root CA 
- DigiCert SHA2 Secure Server CA 
 
4. Conclusion and Future Works 
 
 Network analysis is a vital piece in conducting mobile forensics. In this paper, we have 
successfully presented the network analysis of two popular social networking applications 
(Facebook and Twitter) and one instant messaging application (Telegram) on FxOS. The 
findings of this study reported many valuable forensics evidences such as image files, 
communication texts and authentication credentials detectable in the network traffic. Fortunately, 
captured credentials were not in plaintext. Communications in Telegram were transmitted over 
port 80 in plain text. All communication activities in Facebook and Twitter however were 
encrypted and transmitted over port 443. The other conclusion drawn from this research was that 
not all service providers are storing client data on their servers i.e. Twitter is using the cloud 
services from Akamai Technologies to store their installation files.  Multiple certificates were 
carved from the packets namely Mozilla used the certificates from DigiCert; Google from 
Google Internet Authority, Facebook and Twitter from DigiCert.  
This research has thrown up many questions in need of further investigation. More 
information of FxOS applications investigation would help us to establish a greater degree of 
network traffic forensic accuracy. Further research opportunities include undertaking the process 
outline in this research for cloud storage services. Previous forensic investigation on cloud 
storage services generally used the cloud storage applications on Apple iOS and Google Android 
as case studies. Therefore, the presence of FxOS will increase in-depth study of FxOS forensic in 
cloud storage forensic area. In addition, this research is the first forensic investigation to use the 
phone simulator in order to monitor network traffic on mobile phone. A future study of 
investigating network traffic on other mobile OS using phone simulator would be very 
interesting.  
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